The regional political and economic order in East Asia' has undergone a significant transformation since the end of the Cold War. One of the most important changes is China's growing clout and influence in this region. Several important factors contribute to this development: China's rapid and sustained economic growth (on average 9 per cent per year over the past two decades), Japan's relative decline as a result of its decade-long recession, the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis that decimated several high-flying Asian economies, and the stretching-thin of the United States' military resources and political capital due to the war on terror, the daunting task of rebuilding Iraq, and the challenge posed by a nuclear North Korea.
Whereas China's rise in the mid-l 990s caused much concern among its neighbours and the United States, 2 China's further ascent in the early 2000s has instead generated more equanimity. This shift presents not only an intellectual puzzle but also an important policy question. China's expanding economy is now regarded more as an opportunity than a threat, and its more polished foreign policy exudes confidence and poise.- Comparing today with ASEAN's founding epoch, the contrasts cannot be more vivid: In 1967, China was mired in its angry self-imposed isolation called the Cultural Revolution, whereas ASEAN was established partly to form a collective counterweight against the regime that had exported revolutions and inspired guerrilla wars in Southeast Asia. Nowadays China is deeply engaged with the world and even assumes the hitherto unprecedented role as a trade promoter in East Asia.
What explain these changes? What are the political and economic impetuses for the ASEAN-China FTA? What is the relationship between China's current trade offensive and its "new" foreign policy thinking? Does it signify a long-term and fundamental shift in China's economic statecraft or represent a short-term tactical expedient aimed at buying the crucial time needed for China to develop into an unparalleled power in the region capable of safeguarding its core interests?
This chapter examines the ASEAN-China FTA in light of regionalism in East Asia and China's new diplomacy. It argues that China's FTA with the ASEAN is driven by a political logic to respond to challenges posed by competitive regionalisms in the world economy, to cement growing economic ties with Southeast Asian. nations, to secure raw materials crucial to its economic development, and to ensure a peaceful and stable environment close to home so as to buttress China's growing influence and counterbalance American and Japanese power. It is thus a concrete example of economic statecraft employed to facilitate China's new foreign policy strategy -"peaceful ascendancy". ASEAN nations are attracted by the opportunities brought about by China's economic expansion and trade liberalization; they also seek to leverage their FTA with China to additional FTAs with important trading partners within (for example, Japan) or outside (for example, the United States) the region. However, because of the disparate levels of development and policy priorities of its members, ASEAN's FTA with China is likely to cause various challenges to individual members and the organization as a whole.
This chapter is divided into five parts. The first part is an introduction setting up the issue. The second part offers some background on regional trading arrangements, emphasizing the proliferation of such arrangements in the 1990s. The third part reviews rhe profiles of China's economic interactions with ASEAN. The fourth part examines the main political calculus in China's decision to pursue FTA with ASEAN, paying special attention to the larger strategic factors associated with China's desire to attain "peaceful ascendancy". The last part looks at some of the issues raised by ASEAN-China FTA and speculates i•s eventual success.
RISE OF REGIONALISM IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
Regional economic integration -the deepening of intra-regional economic interdependence in a given region, through intra-regional trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and harmonization of commercial regulations, standards, and practices -probably predated the Westphalian international system. Regionalism is the political movement towards the creation or expansion of regional trade organizations or associations. 5 The proliferation of regional trading blocs -often known as regional integration agreements (RIAs) -and the deepening of relationships among existing members of certain trading blocs are among the major developments in international relations in recent decades. Most industrial and developing countries in the world are members of a regional integration agreement, and many belong to more than one: over one-half of world trade rakes place within such agreements. 6 The past decade witnessed an especially sharp increase in regional trade agreements (RTAs). 7 According to World Trade Organization (WTO) figures, as the end of 2002, a total of 259 RTAs had been notified to rhe WTO and its predecessor, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); among them 176 RTAs are currently in force. An additional 70 RTAs are believed to be operational but not yet notified, and about 70 are under negotiation. Among WTO's 146 members, only Mongolia is not. already in a RTA or engaged in negotiations on preferential agreements. 8 One important reason for the increasing popularity of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) is the seemingly difficult process and bleak prospects for progress on the multilateral agenda -the latest example being the collapse of the WTO meeting in September 2003, after which U.S. trade representative Robert Zoellick warned that the United States might press ahead with bilateral and regional trade deals.
9 Table 2 .1 shows that 43 per cent of world merchandise trade now occurs under the umbrella of preferential trade agreements. If all RTAs currently under negotiation are successfully concluded b~fore 2005, then over 50 per cent of world merchandise trade will occur among countries linked by preferential agreements. Table 2 .1 also shows that as of now, Western Europe leads in preferential trade (hence it evokes the image of "Fortress Europe"), whereas Asia is the least-prone to trade on preferential terms. Indeed, the current proliferation of PTAs in Asia to a considerable extent represents a "catch-up" phenomenon.
PTAs are the obverse of the principle of non-discrimination trade policies. The Anglo-American Allies that planned the world economic system after World War II -which became known as the Bretton Woods systembelieved that the discriminatory trade policies in the 1930s had contributed to the collapse of world trade and in turn to the Great Depression. They enshrined the non-discrimination policy into Article I of the GATT, requiring (unconditional) most-favoured nation (MFN) for all GATT members. 10 However, since its outset, the GATT allowed a major deviation from the MFN principle. Article XXIV states that a group of countries may form a free and set a common level of trade barriers vis-a-vis outsiders. This at a minimum entails a common external tariff, which is no higher than the average of the previously existing tariffs of the member countries. A full CU will set all trade policy for its members as a whole.
(4) Common Market: PTA, FTA, and CU are different models of "shallow integration'', whereas common market and economic union constitute "deep integration". Beyond the free exchange of goods and se~ among members, a common market entails the free movement of factors of production: labour and capital.
(5) Economic Union: Economic union involves harmonizing national economic policies, including typically taxes and a common currency.
The European Union (EU) is the best example of a long process of increased level of integration and the most notable economic union. In contrast, neither the members of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) nor the members of ASEAN FTA expect to literally eliminate all interior barriers to trade, as the name "free trade area" would imply. It should also be pointed out that not all trade among preferential trading partners takes place at preferential rates. Most agreem"ents exclude certain sensitive sectors (for example, agriculture). 
Motivations for Integration
Why do nations pursue regional integration? Largely speaking they do it for two sets of reasons: (1) politics and policymaking, and (2) economics.
As a World Bank publication asserts, "Regional integration is good politics: It meets political needs, such as security or enhanced bargaining power, and it satisfies influential lobbies." 14 Indeed, the main motivation for regional integration is often political, rather than economic. The first motivation is to use integration to consolidate peace and increase regional security. It is ~ften assumed that creating linkages between economies can make conflicts more costly. Both Immanuel Kant's third definitive article of "perpetual peace" -cosmopolitan law 15 - and Thomas Friedman's "Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention 16 affirm this insight. In the post-9/11 environment, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick justified his aggressive pursuit of FTAs with such nations as Jordan, Israel, Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, southern Africa, and Western Hemisphere on national security ground. He argued, "While terrorism isn't caused by poverty ... failed states, broken societies, extreme poverty, create the fertile ground in which the seeds of terrorism can grow, and therefore we have a very strong interest in having a pro-growth and opportunity economic policy that complements our security agenda. " 17 Clearly the United States expected important strategic and political benefits from these FTAs, since the economic benefits were modest.
Second, by joining together the weak can become strong. Governments often seek to acquire greater bargaining power in rhultilateral negotiations by first tying in partner countries through regional commitments. At a regional level, a subset of countries could first strike their own agreement in order to increase bargaining power and press for a better outcome.
Third, regional agreements have been used to lock in institutional changes and reforms. For trade liberalization, regional agreements are a well-designed piece of commitment mechanism because they are built upon reciprocal preferences.
Fourth, vested interests, such as powerful national bureaucracies set up to negotiate trade agreements, or certain sectors of the society that stand to gain or lose, often lobby the governments to seek regional agreements.
Fifth, countries can benefit greatly from co-operation when they share resources -such as rivers, fishing grounds, hydroelectric power, or rail connection -or when they jointly to overcome problems -such as pollution and transportation bottlenecks. By virtue of enhanced trust, regional agreements can help in this regard.
Several economic rationales have also been marshaled for regional agreements, which can be summarized as the allure of reaping benefits from free trade without enduring the cost for adjustment. First, the theory of "second-best" holds that although multilateral agreements that aim at eliminating barriers across the board are almost always preferable, they are also more elusive. Hence, liberalization via a regional agreement might be more beneficial to the world than the status quo.
A second economic reason for governments to seek discriminatory liberalization is that they may be able to reap gains from trade in product areas where they cannot compete internationally. RT As thus could serve the purpose of shutting out third-parry competition from more efficient suppliers.
Third, small countries especially regard participation in regional agreements as a defensive necessity. They fear exclusion from markets and see participation as an insurance policy against being placed at a competitive disadvantage through discriminatory policies. Richard Baldwin calls this "domino theory" of regionalism -idiosyncratic incidents of regionalism triggered a multiplier effect that knocked down bilateral import barriers like a row of dominoes.
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As will be shown later, many of these characteristic political and economic considerations were clearly at work in the case of ASEAN-China FTA. The ASEAN Declaration states that the aims and purposes of the Association are: (1) to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations, and (2) to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries in the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.
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Vincent Wei-cheng Wang Despite these common aspirations, ASEAN members vary considerably -from the tiny oil-rich sultanate of Brunei (population: 300,000) to the world's fourth most populous nation (and the largest Muslim country), Indonesia; from the miniscule economy of Laos to the potential giant, Indonesia; from the impoverished ASEAN-4 to the wealthy Singapore and Brunei. Table 2 .2 presents several basic economic indicators.
The extreme disparity of ASEAN nations as shown in Table 2 .2 raises several important questions. Experiences from other parts of the world, particularly Western Europe, demonstrate that (1) small states are often more active than large states in promoting integration (for example, the Benelux countries were often considered "core" members for each stage in the history of European integration); this is in contrast to the "hegemonic stability" theory, which holds that the existence of a hegemon, both willing and capable of shouldering the cost of maintaining an open system is the prerequisite to liberal economic regimes and institutions; 20 (2) homogeneity -comparable levels of development, ideological affinity, and compatible political systems -facilitates successful "deep" integration; {3) deeper integration among the ~xisting members is often considered helpful for, if not essential to, "shallow integration" with newer members who are characterized by greater heterogeneity (for example, EU's "growing pain" or "hiccups" in integrating · with the former communist countries of Eastern Europe).
. ASEAN nations pride themselves for following certain "fundamental principles" in th • Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; • The right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; • Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; • Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner; • Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and • Effective co-operation among themselves. 21 In January 1992, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was established to eliminate tariff barriers among the Southeast Asian countries with an aim of integrating the ASEAN economies into a single production base and creating a regional market of 500 million people. Under AFTA, tariff rates levied on a wide range of products traded within the region be reduced to no more than five per cent. Quantitative and other non-tariff barriers are to be eliminated.
The newer members were expected to realize AFTA by 2006-10. Table 2 .3 shows the major export and import partners of individual ASEAN members and China. This table shows several interesting patterns. Although China is among the top five trade partners for each ASEAN member, it is not the most important (Myanmar's import is the only exception); its importance to these nations is comparable to that of Taiwan's or South Korea's. In fact, the United States is the top export partner of five out of the ten ASEAN members (and the United States is also China's top export market); and Japan is the top import partner of four ASEAN nations (and Japan is also China's top import source). So, economic arguments are insufficient to explain ASEAN-China FTA. If economy of scale is the main concern, then ASEAN nations (and for that matter China itself) should pursue FTAs with their largest trade partners -the United States and Japan. The fact that the smaller economies band together -a kind of economic "balancing" -shows that the main impetus for the China-ASEAN FTA is a political logic. The next section will examine some of the non-economic rationales for the ASEAN-FTA.
Although China's trade with ASEAN may not be as large or important as ASEAN's trade with the United States or ASEAN-Japan trade, it nevertheless has increased rapidly in recent years. Citing ASEAN official figures, Table 2 Table 2 .5, using official statistics from China's Ministry of Commerce, highlights the importance of ASEAN-China trade but also helps place it in perspective. It should be noted that Table 5 groups together trade data of all fifteen member states of 1he European Union as one entity and the ten members of ASEAN as one entity. This accounting method serves to give the allure of elevated importance for EU and ASEAN -hence, it is politically easier to sell the FTA to ASEAN as a whole and to show that China's trade flows to various markets are "balanced". According to this 24 The race is on. In sum, although increasing trade and investment ties have increased the economic interdependence between China and ASEAN, these relationships are still trailing the region's economic relationships with the United States, although the gap is narrowing. Although these economic facts justify an FTA, more important non-economic reasons explain why China "attaches great importance" to ASEAN-China FTA.
25

POLITICAL LOGIC OF HA: ECONOMIC STATECRAFT OF THE "PEACEFUL ASCENDANCY" POLICY
Commentators have offered various explanations for the initiatives taken by China to sign an FTA with ASEAN countries. Most of these accounts invoke standard economic arguments or fall under the category of conventional wisdom. For example, Kevin Cai identifies the three most crucial rationales for the ASEAN-China FTA: (1) such an FTA helps craft a response to intensified regionalism elsewhere (Europe and North America), (2) FTA helps cement the growing economic ties between China and ASEAN, and (3) FTA helps co-ordinate government policies -a need made painfully clear by the Asian Financial Crisis. 26 Employing a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model based on international parity conditions, James Laurenceson finds that China's integration with the ASEAN-5 is already relatively advanced with respect to goods and services markets and he argues that future benefits from liberalization will be mainly felt in financial markets. 27 Focusing on the ASEAN's four newer countries, Thitapha Wattanapruttipaisan believes chat the ASEAN-China FTA will provide greater market access in resource-and agro-based products and some manufactured goods for the ASEAN-4, but will also see greater competition from China in both ASEAN-4's home and third-country markets. This chapter differs from all these theories by presenting a political logic of China's economic statecraft with respect to Southeast Asia. It argues that China's FTA with ASEAN countries is driven primarily by strategic considerations and that although the main instruments that it uses -FTAs -are economic, China's foremost goals are to ensure survival and to expand power -perennial core realist premises -in a changing (that is, more challenging) security environment. In short, China's FTA with ASEAN exemplifies the economic statecraft of China's "peaceful ascendancy".
The concept of "economic statecraft" involves the utillzation of a state's economic tools (resources and capital) in its foreign policy conduct and is part of a state's statecraft -defined as the art of conducting state affairs. By employing either positive (rewards) or negative (sanctions) means, economic statecraft seeks to advance a state's interests through ways that are less coercive than military means. 29 Although many scholars equate economic statecraft with economic sanctions and consequently question the validity of economic statecraft since "sanctions never work", 30 positive incentives such as trade benefits or aid are no less of instruments for achieving a state's objectives and have not received the same amount of attention.
China's FTA with ASEAN is a good example of this positive approach, and this kind of approach has arguably better achieved the very same goals than what China's previous approach could achieve.
One of the most interesting developments to the scholarly and policy communities in the last two years is China's "new" foreign policy, which marks a significant departure from past practices in several key areas. Variously called "new diplomacy", 31 "peaceful ascendancy" 32 or "peaceful rise" 33 (hepingjueqz), "independent foreign policy of peace", or "pragmatic, balanced strategy in foreign policy" , 34 this new diplomacy contains several important elements. 35 First, it is stimulated by globalization and is based on the conviction that __ China's growth imperatives are tied with globalization. It relies both on China's domestic economy and the international marketplace to sustain and fuel growth. Ch_ina's Fourth-Generation leaders 36 have concluded that the international environment that China faces has changed and the country must respond "correctly to a world which is becoming multipolar, to economic globalization, and to the trend of development in scientific and technologic~l advancement". 37 Now is especially a "period of important strategic opportunity" for achieving China's paramount goalin the words of one analyst, "it is all part of a single-minded focus on e_ conomic development oriented to making China an economic superpower in every respect ... in the next two decades". Second, to achieve that goal, China must secure a peaceful international environment that is crucial to sustaining China's economic development and augmenting China's power. Peace in the Asia-Pacific region -China's backyard -is thus essential. Hence, China's "peaceful ascendancy" is designed to counter deep Asian apprehension about China as a competitor for trade, investment, and jobs. At a practical level, this means that when dealing with its most formidable challenger (the United States) , China must "bide its time and hide its capacities" (taoguang yanghur) -avoiding a premature showdown or confrontation with the United States, especially in light of the Bush administration's imperial strategy; and when dealing with its nervous neighbours, China muse replace its brusque "Great Power Diplomacy", which Third-Generation leaders like Jiang Zemin upheld, with a good-neighbour diplomacy.
The timing is ideal. As the United States is distracted by the war on terror, Iraq, and North Korea, and Southeast Asia is still grappling with the aftermath of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, China's peaceful rise presents an alternative policy agenda and opportunities to Southeast Asian nations. In light of America's single-~inded pursuit of its own narrow agenda and Japan's diminished stature, China's "charm offensive" coward Southeast Asiaincreasing investmem and trade, and proposing myriad of FTAs throughout Asia -has won much good will in the region. 39 Third, this new diplomacy is characterized by several important changes in style, if not substance: ( 1) ·lg.stead of acting like an aggrieved victim, China now aspires to be a responsible great power and is acting increasingly like one. (2) Whereas China used to distrust "multilateralism" for fear that multilateral institutions could be used to constrain or punish it, nowadays Chinese leaders recognize that deeply engaging these organizations help promote the country's trade and security interests and limit American power. For China, the word "multipolarity" sounds like a coded opposition to a world order characterized as "unipolar" (dominated by the United States) and to America's foreign policy style characterized as "unilateralism". (3) On many contentious and intractable issues; China has also adopted more pragmatic stances. On the South China Sea issue, China acceded to ASEAN's Tre~ty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and promoted peaceful dialogue over territorial disputes. On Taiwan, China has replaced its military bluster with economic enticement. (4) China is more aware that its rise has consequences for the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. So it is keen on easing the concerns of various countries. (5) China has become much more actively engaged in, and seeks to shape, regional affairs. Its hosting of the Six-Party Talk over North Korea's nuclear issue is a good example.
Fourth, the major instrument used in advancing China's fundamental objectives is its economic power, which is buoyed by its phenomenal economic growth, rapidly expanding domestic market, and voracious appetite for raw materials for its economic development. FTA with ASEAN helps cultivate goodwill among China's important neighbours, maintain peace and security in the region, defuse American influence, and secure key markets and raw materials needed for China's economic security. It is thus a sine qua non of "peaceful ascendancy'' -the fundamental strategy of China's new diplomacy for survival and development.
To sum up, China's "peaceful ascendancy" is a comprehensive long-term strategy employing globalization as catalyst to accelerate China's economic development and elevate China's power and stature. The language is peace and stability, the style is constructive diplomacy, and the substance is economics -at least for now. 40 The key is ascendancy. The theory leaves open the question what happens after China has ascended: Will it have been fundamentally altered to become a status quo power as a result of the process of peaceful rise and embrace of globalization? Or will China now have the power to throw its weight around? In other words, is peace an end in China's theory of "peaceful rise" or simply a means for achieving ascendancy? No definitive answer can be ascertained at this moment, since the actual outcome is most likely some combination of these two views, and in any case is beyond the scope of this chapter.
China's FTA exemplifies the economic statecraft of this overall strategy. Geopolitics, rather than purely economic reasons, drives China to proactively conduct trade talks. The hallmarks of China's arrival as a major player in world and regional affairs include: (1) using multilateralism co counter what China considers U.S. unilateralism, (2) talking of the need for a new international political and economic order (multipolarity), and (3) promoting an East Asia pact to match European and North American free trade agreements.
ASEAN'S CALCULUS AND FTA'S IMPLICATIONS
What is the calculus for ASEAN nations regarding their FTA with China? How will this FTA impact ASEAN members? How will it affect regional and international balance of pqwer? On the first question, this chapter suggests three fundamental reasons why ASEAN embrace the FTA with China.
' First, each individual ASEAN member is too weak vis-a-vis China. To augment their bargaining power, ASEAN members must pool their resources together so as to overcome the very plausible collective action problem.
Facing an economically rising China, these nations conclude that if they are to have any hope of luring foreign investments, they need co trumpet their growing ties with Asia's next giant. 41 Second, individual ASEAN members clearly see PTA with China as a logical step coward partaking in China's growing domestic market, made increasingly prosperous because of China's entry into the WTO (in December 2001) and the benefits arising from the phasing-in of China's pledged liberalization. China's offer of "early harvest" -a unilateral goodwill measure that would aid the less developed ASEAN nations (called ASEAN-4) in trade facilitation .and would enable mutually beneficial adjustments ahead of the general schedule for the rest of ASEAN -is especially appealing co them.
Third, ASEAN nations see the PTA with China as a catalyst to acceierating tl;eir own integration (AFTA) 42 and a ploy with which to engage larger trading partners, such as Japan, the United States, and the EU. Already, ASEAN-China PTA is causing some concerns for Japan, and prompts Tokyo to redouble its endeavour in engaging an area that it has traditionally dominated. For example, in its summit meeting with ASEAN in December 2003, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pledged US$3 billion in new aid to Southeast Asia (the region is already receiving 60 per cent of its overseas aid from Japan) , and promised to work with the region to maintain security ties, liberate trade, and create a broad "economic parcnership". 43 Interestingly, some analysts view Japan's new emphasis on fostering closer relations with ASEAN as being driven by one major consideration -not to be outdone by China. 44 Even this cursory survey of ASEAN's riiotivation for FTA with China, limited by space, raises three important questions about the impact of the PTA on ASEAN.
First, China could turn out to be a fierce competitor. Rodolfo Severino, ASEAN's secretary-general, is aware that such industries as textiles, toy, and motorcycle manufactures will be negatively affected in the shore term, but he believes long-term benefits will follow. 45 Because of its almost inexhaustible unskilled labour and huge amounts of FDI, China may pose a particularly great challenge to the ASEAN-4 in their home or thi~d-country markets. Currently China is receiving the lion's share of FDI inflows to the entire developing world. As Table 1 shows, in 2000, China received more than three times the combined total of FD I inflows to the ten ASEAN nations. The FDI that is currently going into China (arguably motivated by the intrinsic value of China as an investment site) is unlikely to be distracted by an PTA with ASEAN, whereas some of the FDI going into ASEAN now may end up going into China (because of the region's new ties with the larger market). A caveat 1s m order. Chinese companies are keen on investing in Southeast Asia, especially in the resources sectors. This may mitigate China's competition for FDI with ASEAN somewhat.
Second, there are real concerns that ASEAN-China FTA may undermine AFTA. Some worry that China may distract a core trading group from pursuing its better interests by offering an FTA. These skeptics question whether China's real motivation is actually domination, as opposed to integration, and this could cause the ASEAN to fail to complete its own full integration, and instead try to cash in on the alluring Chinese economy. 46 This is especially true in that compared to China, which has a very dear strategic goal, as discussed earlier, ASEAN does not have a dear picture about its place in the new strategic environment of an emergent China. One Australian analyst thinks that under these circumstances the best that ASEAN can do is to lock itself in as a fringe player on the spokes of China's regional trade architecture, while further enhancing the attractiveness of China as the hub for regional investment and production. 47 A historical metaphor is illustrative here. Historians John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman argue that traditional China, seeing itself as the superior Middle Kingdom, carried out its foreign policy based on a tribute system, which was a "reciprocal foreign relationship between superior and inferior" in that tribute offerings were normally reciprocated by lavish gifts from the emperor; hence, "accepting China's supremacy was materially worthwhile". In addition, the tribute system early became the institutional setting and indeed "cover for foreign trade". 48 Another scholar points out that China and its tributaries had far more interaction with each other than it commonly acknowledged. "Trade, both private and tributary, made up a significant portion of both government revenues and GNP. Under this system, these countries were a thriving, complex, and vibrant regional order" and the tributary system was "a form of disguised staple trade" . 49 This historical metaphor on the China-centric tribute system is at the heart of a current debate in International Relations -whether a hierarchical regional order in East Asia dominated by a rising China promotes more stability or instability. David Kang argues that East Asian regional relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than those in the West, and that when China has been strong and stable, order has been preserved. 50 He argues th~t:
East Asian international relations emphasized formal hierarchy among nations while allowing considerable informal equality. With China as the dominant state and surrounding countries as peripheral or secondary states, as long as hierarchy was observed there was little need for interstate war.
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Logic of China-ASEAN FTA: Economic Statecraft of "Peaceful Ascendancy" 37 Theorizing on why China has successfully managed its relationship with Southeast Asia and Southeast Asian nations have increasingly accepted a normal China, Brantly Womack argues that China's successful diplomatic dealing with Southeast Asia during the reform era is mainly a result of China's successful exercise of leadership in its relationship with Southeast Asia -a relationship characterized by asymmetry. 52 To argue that China's FTA with ASEAN evokes the-ancient tributary system and threatens to institutionalize China's dominant position and ASEAN's subordinate status in the form of trade obviously risks the charge of being a false historical analogy. However, the analogy is not entirely inappropriate, either, as Kang's and Womack's lines seem to suggest. The Chinese are a history-minded people. After all, until recently their foreign policy was driven by the legacy of "century of humiliation". The main difference is that in the past, the Chinese believed in their cultural supremacy and cared more about the other peoples' acknowledgement of China's cultural eminence than actual conquest (again, Kang's description "formal hierarchy vs. informal equality") -in other words, the learning is only one-way. Today, China exists in a globalized world, and to survive in an increasingly challenging environment, China has proved that occasionally it can be a fast learner. Ir is learning the new rules and playing the new games. Learning is now two-way. Liking the FTA to the modern-day tribute system may be an exaggeration, but calling it the economic statecraft of China's "peaceful ascendancy" in light of China's fundamental goal of rising to preeminent power is a historically apt perspective.
As constructionists would like to point out, the structure of elites' beliefs and interests determine whether anarchy is conflictual or co-operative, 53 it is therefore inadequate to simply infer China's real intention from its behaviour. As China is seeking peaceful ascendancy, other countries hope that this portends a positive development and can thus interpret its · more accommodating new diplomacy as a fundamental shift. However, the available evidence is not sufficient to warrant this optimism. After all, the Chinese seem to offer only a tactical reason for their restraint -"biding one's time and hiding one's capabilities". What will they do after d~ey achieve their goal of becoming an economic superpower? \Xi'ill economic success breed an aggressive nationalism? Will it convince Chinese leaders that China can finally take on the United States and turn the rwenry-first century world order to Pax Sinica?
No one knows. Clearly with history in mind, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick recently said that China's increasing economic power and global influence must be integrated into the international communiry.
54 This is not just good economics; it is also good politics.
